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INTRODUCTION
In July 2020, the Louisiana Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal held that a
plaintiff who filed two separate lawsuits arising out of the same transaction
or occurrence was precluded from litigating the second suit against a
different group of defendants, not by the doctrine of res judicata, but by
Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 425. 1 The Fifth Circuit’s
decision reflects a substantial departure from claim-preclusion law in
Louisiana, which has historically only barred subsequent suits between the
same parties. 2 This prerequisite to barring a claim has long been an
essential feature of claim-preclusion devices in both civil law and common
law traditions. 3 The Fifth Circuit’s decision is one of the latest cases in a
split among the Louisiana Circuit Courts of Appeal regarding whether
article 425 bars subsequent suits arising out of the same transaction or
occurrence but between different parties.4 The issue driving this split is the
manifestation of a question that has quietly persisted in Louisiana for
decades: what is the true function of article 425 and how does it relate to
the law of res judicata?
Louisiana’s current res judicata law, governed by Louisiana Revised
Statutes §§ 13:4231 and 13:4232, precludes a lawsuit when there is a valid
and final judgment from another suit that involved the same parties and
arose out of the same transaction or occurrence as the current suit. 5
Historically, Louisiana followed the narrow civil law doctrine of res

COPYRIGHT 2022, by Olivia Guidry.
∗ J.D./D.C.L. candidate, Paul M. Hebert Law Center, Louisiana State
University. Special thanks to Elyce Ieyoub, Brittany Williams Flanders, and the
Volume 82 Editorial Board of the Louisiana Law Review for your thoughtful
contributions to this Comment. Further thanks to my family and friends for your
endless support. I owe all of my accomplishments to you.
1. See Handy v. Par. of Jefferson, 298 So. 3d 380 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir.
2020).
2. See M. David Kurtz & Mark W. Frilot, Res Judicata in Louisiana: A
Synthesis of Competing Interests, 53 LA. B.J. 445, 445 (2006).
3. M.W.K., Res Judicata: The Requirement of Identity of Parties, 91 U.
PENN. L. REV. 467 (1943).
4. Westerman v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 834 So. 2d 445, 448 (La.
Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2002); Spires v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 996 So. 2d 697,
700 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2008); Ward v. State, Dept. of Transp. & Dev., 2 So. 3d
1231, 1235 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 2009); Handy, 298 So. 3d at 390; Carollo v.
Dep’t of Transp. & Dev., No. 2021-0114, 2021 WL 4785542, at *10 (La. Ct. App.
4th Cir. Oct. 14, 2021).
5. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:4231 (2021).
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judicata. 6 But in 1990, the Louisiana Legislature expanded the doctrine of
res judicata to be more akin to the common law model, and this version of
res judicata is still in effect today. 7 Because these significant changes to
res judicata would have far-reaching consequences across Louisiana’s
procedural law, the legislature also amended several Louisiana Code of
Civil Procedure articles—including article 425—in the same act as the res
judicata amendments, hereinafter referred to as “the 1990 Res Judicata
Act” or “the Act.” 8
Before the 1990 Res Judicata Act, Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure
article 425 governed the doctrine of “splitting a cause of action,” which
historically functioned as a distinct claim-preclusion device but became
confused and intertwined with res judicata in the years leading up to the
Act. 9 Today, article 425 provides, “A party shall assert all causes of action
arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the
litigation.” 10 Notably, unlike the res judicata statutes, the language of this
article does not limit its application to suits “between the same parties.” 11
At first, courts consistently treated the new version of article 425 as
synonymous with the doctrine of res judicata, 12 but the absence of this
“between the same parties” language has led some courts to interpret
article 425 differently. 13 The Second, Third, and Fourth circuits have held
that article 425 is merely a reference to the requirements of res judicata,
and thus a claim can never be precluded unless it is between the same
parties as a prior claim. 14 In contrast, the First and Fifth circuits have found

6. See Hope v. Madison, 193 So. 666, 668 (La. 1940) (“[T]he law and
jurisprudence of this state with respect to the plea of res judicata is different from
the so-called common law doctrine . . . .”).
7. Act No. 521, 1990 La. Acts 1174.
8. Id.
9. John A. Dixon, Jr., Robert W. Booksh, Jr. & Paul L. Zimmering, Res
Judicata in Louisiana Since Hope v. Madison, 51 TUL. L. REV. 611, 641 (1977);
Peter Wilbert Arbour, The Louisiana Concept of Res Judicata, 34 LA. L. REV.
763, 779 (1973).
10. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 425 (2021).
11. Id.; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:4231 (2021).
12. Wood v. May, 658 So. 2d 8, 9 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1995); Millet v.
Crump, 704 So. 2d 305, 306 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 1997); Fine v. Reg’l Transit
Auth., 676 So. 2d 1134, 1136 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1996).
13. Westerman v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 834 So. 2d 445, 448 (La.
Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2002); Handy v. Par. of Jefferson, 298 So. 3d 380, 390 (La. Ct.
App. 5th Cir. 2020).
14. Ward v. State Dept. of Transp. & Dev., 2 So. 3d 1231, 1234 (La. Ct. App.
2d Cir. 2009); Spires v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 996 So. 2d 697, 700 (La.

1184

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82

that article 425 operates as an independent claim-preclusion device and
does not require the parties in each suit to be the same for a claim to be
precluded. 15 Until this split is resolved, litigants in Louisiana will be
uncertain of whether their claims and defenses are validly asserted or
wrongfully precluded under article 425.
An independent statutory analysis and review of the legislative history
of article 425 and the 1990 Res Judicata Act reveal that the Second, Third,
and Fourth circuits correctly interpreted article 425 as a warning to
litigants of the effects of res judicata, rather than as an independent claimpreclusion device. To resolve this circuit split, the Louisiana Legislature
should repeal article 425 and redesignate §§ 13:4231 and 4232 as Code of
Civil Procedure articles. Article 425’s operation as a broad reference to
§§ 13:4231 and 4232 without expressly referencing those statutes has
understandably led to the interpretation that the legislature intended article
425 to continue to function as a distinct claim-preclusion device, as it did
before the 1990 Res Judicata Act. Repealing article 425 resolves this
ambiguity by eliminating the redundant representation of res judicata in
the law. Further, because res judicata is an important, central precept of
Louisiana’s procedural law, it belongs in the Louisiana Code of Civil
Procedure rather than in the Revised Statutes. Redesignating §§ 13:4231
and 4232 as Code of Civil Procedure articles maintains res judicata’s
position in the Code that would otherwise be lost by the mere repeal of
article 425.
Part I of this Comment provides background information about
Louisiana’s history of res judicata, article 425, and the amendments to both
in the 1990 Res Judicata Act. Part II examines the current circuit split
regarding the interpretation of article 425 and its relationship to res
judicata. Part III of this Comment resolves the circuit split through
independent statutory analysis of article 425, including examination of the
article’s plain language and purpose, its legislative history, and its
relationship to other Code of Civil Procedure provisions. Finally, Part III
concludes by recommending the repeal of article 425 and redesignation of
§§ 13:4231 and 4232 to resolve the circuit split.

Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2008); Carollo v. Dep’t of Transp. & Dev., No. 2021-0114, 2021
WL 4785542 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. Oct. 14, 2021).
15. Westerman, 834 So. 2d at 448; Handy, 298 So. 3d at 390.

2022]

COMMENT

1185

I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE COMPLEX RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN RES
JUDICATA AND ARTICLE 425
When introduced, res judicata and article 425 governed entirely
different concepts, but over time, courts and scholars gradually associated
the two to such a degree that some began referring to article 425 as a
“corollary” to res judicata. 16 The pervasiveness of this corollary view is
evident in the treatment of article 425 in the 1990 Res Judicata Act, which
ultimately led to the current circuit split.
A. Res Judicata: From Civil to Common Law
Res judicata, which literally translates to “the thing adjudged,” 17
precludes the relitigation of matters already judicially decided. 18 Res
judicata allows parties to determine with certainty their rights and
obligations with regard to a particular incident and prevents the imposition
of conflicting decisions. 19 It also promotes judicial efficiency and prevents
harassment through repeated litigation of the same controversy. 20 Res
judicata must balance these rationales with the fundamental purpose of the
courts to hear and adjudicate all disputes without depriving anyone of their
day in court. 21 Common law jurisdictions base their res judicata doctrine
on the concept of extinguishing the cause of action. 22 Under this idea of
extinguishment, once a judgment is final, all claims and issues that a party
might have pled with regard to that cause of action merge into the
judgment, barring the parties to the litigation from asserting those claims
in any future action. 23
The civil law tradition bases its narrower doctrine of res judicata on
an irrebuttable presumption of the correctness of judgments. 24 In other
words, because a court’s judgment on fully litigated matters is presumably
correct, a subsequent suit on the same matters could not, and should not,

16. Sutterfield v. Fireman’s Fund Am. Ins. Co., 344 So. 2d 1159, 1161 (La.
Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1977); Succession of Raziano, 538 So. 2d 1136, 1138 (La. Ct.
App. 5th Cir. 1989).
17. R.G. Claitor’s Realty v. Juban, 391 So. 2d 394, 397 (La. 1980).
18. Arbour, supra note 9, at 763.
19. Dixon et al., supra note 9, at 611.
20. Arbour, supra note 9, at 763.
21. Id. at 764.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
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reach a different result. 25 Because res judicata in the civil law is motivated
by a desire to prevent contradictions, it only precludes litigation of a suit
that is practically identical to a prior suit.26 In contrast, the common law’s
goals of promoting judicial efficiency and minimizing harassment of
defendants result in a much broader application of res judicata. 27
Louisiana’s law of res judicata originated from the civil law tradition, 28
but the Louisiana Legislature expanded the law in 1990 to reflect common
law res judicata principles. 29
1. Origins: Louisiana Civil Code Article 2286
For most of Louisiana’s history, Louisiana Civil Code article 2286,
which has since been repealed, governed the doctrine of res judicata. 30
Originating from the Code Napoleon of 1804, 31 article 2286 provided:
The authority of the thing adjudged takes place only with respect
to what was the object of the judgment. The thing demanded must
be the same; the demand must be founded on the same cause of
action; the demand must be between the same parties, and formed
by them against each other in the same quality. 32
The restrictiveness of the word “only” in the first sentence of the article
reflects its narrow civil law origins and strict basis in the correctness-ofjudgment rationale. 33 Under this version of the article, res judicata barred
a second action only when a prior action (1) sought the same relief, (2) was
based on the same cause of action, and (3) was between the same parties. 34
These three elements were often referred to as the three “identities”:

25. McClendon v. State, Dep’t of Transp. & Dev., 642 So. 2d 157, 159 (La.
1994).
26. Arbour, supra note 9, at 764.
27. Id.
28. Hope v. Madison, 193 So. 666, 668 (La. 1940).
29. Kurtz & Frilot, supra note 2, at 445.
30. Mitchell v. Bertolla, 340 So. 2d 287, 290–91 (La. 1976).
31. This article was codified into the Louisiana Civil Code of 1808 as article
252. Id. Later, in the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870, the legislature moved res
judicata to article 2286, where it remained until it was repealed in 1984.
32. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2268 (1870).
33. Arbour, supra note 9, at 764.
34. Sutterfield v. Fireman’s Fund Am. Ins. Co., 344 So. 2d 1159, 1161 (La.
Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1977); Kurtz & Frilot, supra note 2, at 445.
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identity of thing demanded, identity of cause of action, and identity of
parties. 35
When interpreting article 2286’s identity-of-cause-of-action
requirement in Mitchell v. Bertolla, the Louisiana Supreme Court found
that the words “cause of action” in article 2286 were a mistranslation of
the French source article and instead interpreted them to mean “cause.” 36
The court defined “cause” as “the juridical or material fact which is the
basis of the right claimed, or the defense pleaded” 37 and went on to explain
that “cause” in Louisiana may be likened to the grounds on which the
cause of action is based. 38 Thus, under the civil law res judicata regime in
Louisiana, a plaintiff could repeatedly sue the same defendant for the same
harm as long as he asserted a new legal theory of recovery or sought
different relief. 39
For example, 40 suppose A and B enter into a contract of lease. A, the
lessor, later files suit against B, the lessee, seeking dissolution of the
contract for B’s alleged nonpayment of rent. The court rules in favor of B
and dismisses A’s action with prejudice. Thereafter, A files a second suit
against B, again seeking dissolution of the contract, but instead argues that
35. Marilyn C. Maloney, Comment, Preclusion Devices in Louisiana:
Collateral Estoppel, 35 LA. L. REV. 158, 165 (1974); Comment, Litigation
Preclusion in Louisiana: Welch v. Crown Zellerbach Corporation and the Death
of Collateral Estoppel, 53 TUL. L. REV. 875, 878 (1978).
36. Mitchell v. Bertolla, 340 So. 2d 287, 292 (La. 1976).
37. Id. at 291 (quoting 2 PLANIOL, TRAITE ELEMENTAIRE DE DROIT CIVIL 34
(11 ed. 1939)).
38. Id.
39. See, e.g., Rivette v. Moreau, 336 So. 2d 864, 866 (La. 1976) (defense to
probate of statutory will in prior suit based on testator’s inability to read and write
does not foreclose defense to probate of will in subsequent suit based on alleged
revocation by testator); Scurlock Oil Co. v. Getty Oil Co., 294 So. 2d 810, 819
(La. 1974) (first suit seeking cancellation of assignee’s oil lease on grounds that
royalties were not paid, that ninety days had lapsed before production commenced
anew and on two other grounds; subsequent suit seeking cancellation on ground
that lease was sublease and not assignment and was extinguished when main lease
was cancelled); Nicholson v. Holloway Planting Co., 284 So. 2d 898, 901 (La.
1973) (prior suit for injunction for obstruction of servitude of drain; subsequent
suit for injunction for obstruction of servitude of drain and damages that accrued
subsequent to first suit); Leadman v. First Nat’l Bank, 3 So. 2d 739, 741 (La.
1941) (in the first suit, minor plaintiff sought to recover money based on allegedly
fraudulent scheme used by bank; in second suit, same plaintiff demanded return
of money based on expenditure of his funds without court authorization).
40. This example is adapted and simplified from the facts of the Mitchell
case.
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the contract is null for fraud. B files a peremptory exception raising the
objection of res judicata. Here, both suits are between A as lessor and B as
lessee; therefore, the parties are the same. Additionally, the relief
demanded in both suits is the same: dissolution of the contract. However,
the cause in the first suit is the nonpayment of rent, and the cause in the
second suit is fraud. 41 Thus, one of the three identities under article 2286
is not met, and res judicata does not preclude A from bringing the second
suit. Although this result is contrary to Louisiana’s current res judicata
laws, the civil law correctness-of-judgment rationale supports this result.
The court in the first suit did not rule on whether B committed fraud
against A, so a judgment in the second suit would not contradict the
correctness of the first judgment.
Under different circumstances, however, the correctness-of-judgment
rationale is no longer adequately supported. Suppose C and D enter into a
contract of sale, and C subsequently sues D, seeking dissolution of the
contract for D’s failure to perform. The court finds that D did not breach
his duty to perform under the contract and rules in favor of D.
Subsequently, C files a new suit against D in a different court, again
alleging D’s failure to perform, but this time seeking damages. The two
actions are between the same parties and are based on the same cause: D’s
failure to perform. However, in this factual scenario, the thing demanded
is different. In the first suit, C sought dissolution, but in the second, C
sought damages. Again, the three identities are not met, and thus res
judicata does not preclude the second suit. However, suppose the second
court rules in favor of C, finding that D did breach his duty to perform
under the contract. Now, the judgment of the first court, which found that
D did not breach his duty, has been contradicted, and the correctness-ofjudgment rationale no longer applies. Inconsistent and inequitable results
like this frustrated litigants and confused attorneys and courts for years
until the legislature expanded the doctrine of res judicata in 1990.
2. Louisiana Revised Statutes § 13:4231 and the Shift to Common
Law Res Judicata
The 1984 Civil Code Revision, which significantly changed the
structure of the Civil Code, redesignated article 2286 to its current location
41. Remember that cause is the juridical or material fact that is the basis of
the right claimed. Here, A is claiming the right to dissolution of the contract. In
the first suit, the basis of that claim is the fact that B did not pay rent. In the second
suit, the basis of that claim is the fact that B fraudulently induced A to enter into
the contract. Thus, the juridical and material facts, or grounds for recovery, are
different.
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at Louisiana Revised Statutes § 13:4231 but did not substantively change
the law. 42 Six years later, the legislature passed the 1990 Res Judicata Act
to expand the doctrine of res judicata to be more akin to the common law.43
The Act implemented this shift through three changes: first, it completely
rewrote the general rules of res judicata in § 13:4231; second, it enacted
Louisiana Revised Statutes § 13:4232, which provided exceptions to the
rules of § 13:4231; and finally, it amended several related articles in the
Code of Civil Procedure, including article 425. 44
Today, § 13:4231 provides that “a valid and final judgment is
conclusive between the same parties, except on appeal or other direct
review” such that “all causes of action existing at the time of final
judgment arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject
matter of the litigation are extinguished . . . .” 45 Thus, generally, for
Louisiana’s current law of res judicata to preclude a lawsuit, there must be
a valid and final judgment in a prior lawsuit that (1) involved the same
parties as the subsequent suit and (2) arose out of the same transaction or
occurrence as the subsequent suit. 46 The change shifted the focus of the
inquiry from “cause” or “cause of action” to “transaction or occurrence” 47
and eliminated the requirement that the subsequent suit have the same
demand for relief as the previous suit. 48
By predicating the applicability of res judicata on the transaction or
occurrence instead of the theory of recovery, the 1990 Res Judicata Act
significantly broadened the law of res judicata to preclude far more suits
than before. 49 For example, in the first hypothetical above, A was able to
separately sue B under different theories of recovery because the two
actions were not based on the same cause.50 Under the new law, res
judicata would bar A’s second suit because both suits are based on the
42. Saul Litvinoff, Introduction, The 1984 Revision of the Louisiana Civil
Code’s Articles on Obligations—A Student Symposium, 45 LA. L. REV. 747, 747
(1985); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:4231 cmt. a (1984).
43. Act No. 521, 1990 La. Acts 1174; Kurtz & Frilot, supra note 2, at 445.
44. Act No. 521, 1990 La. Acts 1174. The amendments to § 13:4231 also
added issue preclusion to the statute, but this change is not relevant to
understanding the historical relationship between res judicata and article 425,
which only speaks to claim preclusion. For a brief explanation of issue preclusion,
see infra note 218.
45. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:4231 (2021) (emphasis added).
46. Id.
47. The comments describe the “same transaction or occurrence” inquiry as
“comparatively easy to determine.” Id. § 13:4231 cmt. a.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. See supra hypothetical in text beginning at note 41.
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same transaction or occurrence, the contract of lease.51 The comments to
the § 13:4231 amendment explain that the prior version of res judicata was
“too narrow to fully implement the purpose of res judicata” and that this
change promotes judicial efficiency and fairness, prevents needless
relitigation of the same facts, and frees defendants from vexatious
litigation. 52 This comment exemplifies the legislature’s choice to shift
Louisiana’s res judicata away from the correctness-of-judgment rationale
of the civil law toward the extinguishment rationale of the common law.
The legislature’s significant expansion of res judicata necessitated the
revision of related procedural provisions, which were also amended as part
of the 1990 Res Judicata Act. 53 For example, article 891, which provides
the requirements for the form of petitions, previously required petitions to
set forth a “concise statement of the object of the demand and of the
material facts upon which the cause of action is based.” 54 The 1990 Res
Judicata Act amended article 891 to require a “concise statement of all
causes of action arising out of, and of the material facts of, the transaction
or occurrence that is the subject matter of the litigation.” 55 The Act
amended several other Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure articles in a
similar manner, simply updating language regarding “object of the
demand” or “cause of action,” based on pre-amendment res judicata law,
to the new res judicata standard of “same transaction or occurrence.” 56
51. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:4231 cmt. a (2021), which uses the
Mitchell case, on which this hypothetical is based, to demonstrate this expansion.
Similarly, in the second hypothetical, C was able to separately sue D for
dissolution of the contract in the first suit and damages in the second because the
object of the demand had changed, but the new version of res judicata would bar
C’s second suit because both suits are based on the same transaction or
occurrence, the contract of sale.
52. Id.
53. Act No. 521, 1990 La. Acts 1174.
54. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 891 (1960) (emphasis added).
55. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 891 (2021) (emphasis added) (The
comment to the amendment states, “This Article is amended to reflect the changes
made in the defense of res judicata.”).
56. Article 531, which governs lis pendens, previously provided an exception
by which a defendant may have a second suit dismissed when “two or more suits
are pending in a Louisiana court or courts on the same cause of action, between
the same parties in the same capacities, and having the same object . . . .” LA.
CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 531 (1960). The current language allows a defendant
to dismiss a second suit when “two or more suits are pending in a Louisiana court
or courts on the same transaction or occurrence, between the same parties in the
same capacities . . . .” LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 531 (2021). For another
example, see article 532.
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Other amendments in the 1990 Res Judicata Act were more
significant, such as those in Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article
1061, which governs reconventional demands. 57 The previous version of
article 1061 provided that a defendant may assert any causes of action he
may have against the plaintiff in a reconventional demand. 58 Because of
the permissive language of this version of the article, a defendant who was
sued for his negligence in a car accident could seek damages for the
plaintiff’s negligence in a separate lawsuit instead of in a reconventional
demand. 59 This result was consistent with the pre-1990 doctrine of res
judicata because the demands (the plaintiff’s damages and the defendant’s
damages) and the causes (the defendant’s negligence and the plaintiff’s
negligence) were different. 60 The new res judicata law, however, would
preclude this defendant from asserting his negligence claim in a separate
lawsuit because it arose out of the same transaction or occurrence as the
first lawsuit—the car accident. 61 Accordingly, the 1990 Res Judicata Act
added a paragraph to article 1061, which now requires the defendant to
assert all causes of action he may have against the plaintiff that arise out
of the same transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the
principal action.62
The Code of Civil Procedure article that underwent the most
significant amendment in the 1990 Res Judicata Act is article 425.63
However, the exact function of amended article 425 is still unclear, and
this uncertainty has led to the current split among the Louisiana Circuit
Courts of Appeal. 64

57. Act No. 521, 1990 La. Acts 1174.
58. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 1061 (1960).
59. See generally LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2268 (1870).
60. See generally LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:4231 (1984).
61. See generally LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:4231 (2021).
62. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 1061 (2021).
63. See generally Act No. 521, 1990 La. Acts 1174.
64. Westerman v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 834 So. 2d 445, 448 (La.
Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2002); Ward v. State Dep’t of Transp. & Dev., 2 So. 3d 1231,
1234 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 2009); Spires v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 996
So. 2d 697, 699 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2008); Handy v. Par. of Jefferson, 298 So.
3d 380, 390 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 2020); Carollo v. Dep’t of Transp. & Dev., No.
2021-0114, 2021 WL 4785542, at *10 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. Oct. 14, 2021).
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B. Article 425: Development Over Time 65
Courts and litigants have treated article 425 inconsistently since its
enactment in 1960. In the years following its enactment courts most
commonly interpreted article 425 as the doctrine of “splitting the cause of
action”—an independent claim-preclusion device from res judicata. 66
Eventually, article 425 and res judicata became so intertwined that article
425 was treated as a “corollary” to res judicata.67 Then, in the years
following the 1990 amendments, courts consistently treated the amended
version of article 425 as synonymous with res judicata. 68
1. Origins: A Catchall Claim-Preclusion Device
When article 425 was enacted in 1960, it provided, “An obligee cannot
divide an obligation due him for the purpose of bringing separate actions
on different portions thereof” and further explained that an obligee who
brought an action to enforce only a portion of the obligation waived his
right to enforce the rest. 69 According to the Louisiana State Law Institute,
the bases of this new provision were in articles 91(2) and 156 of the
Louisiana Code of Practice of 1870 and in article 87(2) of the Code of
Civil Procedure of Quebec. 70 Entitled “Division of cause of action, effect,”
65. Because the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure has never designated an
official procedural device for raising an objection under article 425, litigants
alleging a violation of article 425 often filed different types of exceptions. In the
cases discussed in the following subsection, regardless of the particular procedural
devices employed, each objecting party argued that his opponent split his cause
of action under article 425.
66. Charles W. Darnall, Jr., Louisiana Practice—Splitting Causes of Action,
14 LA. L. REV. 905, 906 (1954).
67. Sutterfield v. Fireman’s Fund Am. Ins. Co., 344 So. 2d 1159, 1161 (La.
Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1977); Succession of Raziano, 538 So. 2d 1136, 1138 (La. Ct.
App. 5th Cir. 1989).
68. Wood v. May, 658 So. 2d 8, 9 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1995), rev’d on other
grounds, 663 So. 2d 739 (La. 1995); Millet v. Crump, 704 So. 2d 305 (La. Ct.
App. 5th Cir. 1997); Fine v. Reg’l Transit Auth., 676 So. 2d 1134 (La. Ct. App.
4th Cir. 1996).
69. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 425 (1960).
70. LA. STATE LAW INST., CODE OF PRACTICE REVISION, NO. 5 EXPOSE DES
MOTIFS 13 (1954). Article 91(2) of the Louisiana Code of Practice stated, “But if
one, in order to give jurisdiction to a judge, demand a sum below that which is
really due to him, he shall be presumed to have remitted the overplus, and after
having obtained judgment for the sum he had claimed, he shall lose all right of
action for that overplus.” LA. CODE PRAC. art. 91 (repealed 1960). Article 156 of

2022]

COMMENT

1193

article 425 was generally regarded as a codification of the jurisprudentially
developed 71 claim-preclusion device, “splitting a cause of action.” 72
Article 425 was most commonly used to prohibit plaintiffs from filing
multiple suits against the same defendant for the same harm but seeking
different relief. 73 Courts analyzing article 425 explained that the article
was designed to minimize litigation and prevent harassment of defendants
with a multiplicity of suits based upon the same claim. 74 Interestingly,
these rationales reflect the common law res judicata more than the civil
law res judicata. 75
Although the Law Institute claimed the bases of article 425 were
rooted in the Louisiana Code of Practice and Quebecois civil procedure,
the comments to article 425 only mention the Quebecois code article and

the Louisiana Code of Practice stated, “If one demands less than is due him, and
do not amend his petition, in order to augment his demand, he shall lose the
overplus.” LA. CODE PRAC. art. 156 (repealed 1960). Article 87(2) of the Code of
Civil Procedure of Quebec stated, “A creditor cannot divide his debt for the
purpose of suing for the several portions of it by different actions.” CODE CIV.
PROC. QUEBEC art. 87 (repealed). However, prior to its codification in article 425,
commentators noted that the doctrine against splitting a cause of action was only
“approached obliquely” by Code of Practice articles 91(2) and 156. Darnall, supra
note 66, at 907.
71. See Delahaye v. Pellerin, 2 Mart. (o.s.) 142 (Orleans 1812) (where
possession of a slave was recovered in one suit, a subsequent suit for damages for
wrongful detention of the slave was dismissed); McCaleb v. Est. of Fluker, 14 La.
Ann. 316 (1859) (where the value of notes was recovered in one suit, a subsequent
suit for attorney fees was dismissed); Stafford v. Stafford, 25 La. Ann. 223 (1873)
(where a wife recovered paraphernal funds in one suit, a subsequent suit for
additional paraphernal funds was dismissed); Pic v. Mente & Co., Inc., 9 So. 2d
532, 533 (La. 1942) (where two suits brought in city court for amounts purchased
on one open account were held to constitute one indivisible cause of action).
72. See Darensbourg v. Columbia Cas. Co., 140 So. 2d 241, 244 (La. Ct. App.
4th Cir. 1962) (“splitting of a single cause of action, a procedure prohibited under
our law both by the jurisprudence applicable to the instant case and, more recently,
by Article 425 of the LSA-Code of Civil Procedure”); Carney v. Hartford Acc. &
Indem. Co., 250 So. 2d 776 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1970) (“splitting of cause of
action in contravention of LSA-C.C.P. art. 425”); Montgomery v. Am. Fire &
Indem. Co., 366 So. 2d 201, 201–02 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1978) (“plaintiffs split
their cause of action, which is prohibited by C.C.P. Article 425”).
73. See discussion infra beginning at note 83.
74. See, e.g., Reed v. Classified Parking Sys., 324 So. 2d 484, 488 (La. Ct.
App. 2d Cir. 1975).
75. See discussion of the different rationales behind common law and civil
law res judicata at supra notes 22–27.
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its related jurisprudence. 76 Interpreted together, the three cases cited in
connection with the Quebecois code article stand for the rule that a
plaintiff cannot break his monetary demands into multiple suits so that the
amount prayed for does not exceed the jurisdictional limit of the plaintiff’s
preferred court. 77 However, no reported decision applied article 425 in this
way, likely because Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 5, enacted
at the same time and cross-referenced in the comments to article 425, states
this rule more directly. 78
Consistent with one pre-1960 application of Louisiana Code of
Practice article 156, 79 some courts initially applied article 425 as limiting
the plaintiff’s recovery to the amount prayed for in her demand.80 In
Sylvester v. Sylvester, Mrs. Sylvester demanded from her ex-husband 40
head of cattle that had been awarded to her in their community property
settlement agreement, as well as the offspring of the 40 cattle. 81 After the
Third Circuit Court of Appeal held that Mrs. Sylvester owned an
undivided one-half interest in the offspring of all 200 cattle in the herd, the
76. LA. CODE. CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 425 cmt. c (1960); State ex. rel. Dobson
v. Newman, 21 So. 189 (La. 1897) (plaintiff filed 17 concurrent suits against
defendant in the same court, each for a different $10 promissory note, because the
total amount of $170 exceeded the jurisdictional limit of the court; the court held
that the complaints stated one indivisible cause of action which could not be
divided into a multiplicity of suits); Kearney v. Fenerty, 171 So. 57, 58 (La. 1936)
(where two suits were brought in city court on fifteen twenty-five dollar rent notes
containing an acceleration clause, the court held that nonpayment of the first note
caused all fifteen to become a single matured obligation for which only one suit
could be brought); Reynolds & Henry Const. Co. v. Mayor of Monroe, 17 So.
802, 802 (La. 1895) (“A party cannot sue the defendant on installments growing
out of the same contract, when the whole amount was due when suit was first
brought. He is presumed to have asked all that he was entitled to in the first
demand.”).
77. Cantrelle Fence & Supply Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 515 So. 2d 1074, 1077
(La. 1987).
78. See LA. CODE. CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 5 (2021).
79. See Brooks v. Wortman, 22 La. Ann. 491 (1870) (where plaintiff in
reconvention in a petitory action secured judgment for the total amount of the
reconventional demand and then on appeal asked that the amount be increased,
the request was denied on the ground that plaintiff in reconvention, having failed
to amend his petition, must lose the overplus under article 156).
80. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Cannizzarro, 142 So. 2d 566 (La. Ct. App.
4th Cir. 1962) (where the Fourth Circuit held that article 425 did not limit
plaintiff’s recovery to $24.83, which was mistakenly demanded in the original
petition due to a clerical error, because the plaintiff filed a timely amendment to
the pleading to demand repayment of the full amount of $234.83).
81. Sylvester v. Sylvester, 146 So. 2d 154, 155 (La. 1962).
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Louisiana Supreme Court explained that this judgment could not stand, as
its decree in favor of Mrs. Sylvester was for a greater portion of the cattle’s
offspring than she demanded. 82 However, this use for article 425 was
short-lived.
Article 425’s primary application as a prohibition on dividing one’s
tort claims originated from the pre-1960 jurisprudence on splitting a cause
of action. 83 In the 1953 case Fortenberry v. Clay, the plaintiff filed a suit
to recover for property damage sustained in a car accident.84 Prior to trial,
the plaintiff filed a second suit against the same defendants to recover for
personal injuries arising from the same accident. 85 After the conclusion of
the first suit, the defendants filed an exception of no right of action in the
second suit, arguing that the plaintiff had split his cause of action. 86 The
trial court granted the exception and dismissed the second action.87 The
First Circuit Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that a single tort creates
only one cause of action. 88 The court explained that this prohibition on
splitting a cause of action was necessary because otherwise “there would
be an undetermined number of suits between the same parties arising out
of one wrongful action.” 89
In the 1975 case Richard v. Travelers Insurance Co., the Third Circuit
Court of Appeal cited Fortenberry and used article 425 to apply this same
rule. 90 In Richard, the victim of a car accident filed two consecutive suits
against the same defendant, the driver of the other car. 91 In the first action,
the plaintiff sought recovery for the damages to his car, and in the second,
for his wife’s 92 medical expenses. 93 The defendant moved for summary
judgment, arguing that the plaintiff had split his cause of action in

82. Id. at 157.
83. See generally Thigpen v. Guarisco, 197 So. 2d 904 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir.
1967); Thompson v. Kivett & Reel, Inc., 25 So. 2d 124 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir.
1946); Jackson v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 199 So. 419 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1940).
84. Fortenberry v. Clay, 68 So. 2d 133, 134 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1953).
85. Id.
86. Id. at 135.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Richard v. Travelers Ins. Co., 323 So. 2d 176, 178 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir.
1975).
91. Id. at 177.
92. Under the law at that time, only the husband could sue for the claims
belonging to the community. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 686 (1976).
93. Richard, 323 So. 2d at 177.
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contravention of article 425. 94 In granting the motion for summary
judgment, the Third Circuit explained that the majority rule in Louisiana
was that only one cause of action arose when one wrongful act caused
multiple types of damages, so the defendant’s tortious conduct in causing
the car accident had only created one obligation to the community. 95 Thus,
the court concluded that the plaintiff split his cause of action under article
425 when he only sought to recover for a portion of that obligation in the
first suit, and as a result, had waived his right to enforce the remaining
portion of the obligation. 96
Besides these few cases, courts and practitioners rarely took advantage
of article 425 in the years following its enactment. Between 1960 and
1980, article 425 was cited only 14 times by the Louisiana Courts of
Appeal and only twice by the Louisiana Supreme Court. 97 The courts that
did address arguments under article 425 often resolved the issue on other
grounds. 98 For example, in Honeycutt v. Town of Boyce, the Louisiana
Supreme Court held that article 425 did not preclude the plaintiff’s second
action because the plaintiff had reserved his rights against the defendant
in the judgment of the previous suit. 99 In another case, Reed v. Classified
94. Id. The defendant also filed an exception of res judicata, but the trial court
and the Second Circuit both declined to address this argument. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.; see also Harrison v. State Dep’t of Highways, 375 So. 2d 169, 180
(La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1979) (article 425’s “application to the tort obligation would
be to prevent a suit for damages sustained from the laceration and scarring of the
face and a later suit for a broken leg, when both injuries came out of the same
accident.”).
97. See generally Harrison, 375 So. 2d 169; Harris v. Bardwell, 373 So. 2d
777 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1979); Montgomery v. Am. Fire & Indem. Co., 366 So.
2d 201 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1978); Parish v. Bill Watson Ford, Inc., 354 So. 2d
727 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1978); Derbofen v. T.L. James & Co., Inc., 355 So. 2d 963
(La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1977); Sutterfield v. Fireman’s Fund Am. Ins. Co., 344 So.
2d 1159 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1977); Honeycutt v. Town of Boyce, 327 So. 2d
154 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1976), rev’d, 341 So. 2d 327 (La. 1976); Reed v.
Classified Parking Sys., 324 So. 2d 484, 488 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1975); Richard,
323 So. 2d 176; Bugg v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 295 So. 2d 194 (La. Ct.
App. 4th Cir. 1974); Carney v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 250 So. 2d 776 (La.
Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1970); Sylvester v. Sylvester, 146 So. 2d 154 (La. 1962); Sears,
Roebuck & Co. v. Cannizzarro, 142 So. 2d 566 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1962);
Darensbourg v. Columbia Cas. Co., 140 So. 2d 241 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1962);
Futch v. Fidelity & Cas. Co. of N.Y., 136 So. 2d 724 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir.).
98. Honeycutt, 341 So. 2d 327; Reed, 324 So. 2d at 488; Futch, 136 So. 2d
724; Carney, 250 So. 2d 776.
99. Honeycutt, 341 So. 2d 327.
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Parking System, the Second Circuit Court of Appeal held that article 425
did not preclude the second suit because the cause of action did not accrue
until the conclusion of the prior suit. 100 The resulting lack of case law
analyzing and interpreting article 425 stunted the article’s development
and laid the groundwork for the confusion causing the current circuit split.
2. Article 425’s Relationship to Res Judicata Prior to the 1990 Res
Judicata Act
In the years leading up to the 1990 Res Judicata Act, article 425 and
res judicata became closely associated. Parties objecting under article 425
would almost always simultaneously file an exception of res judicata. 101
In this era of strict adherence to civil law claim preclusion, public policy
favored allowing cases to proceed, so courts strictly analyzed and rarely
granted motions under res judicata and article 425. 102
To understand the interaction between these two doctrines prior to the
1990 amendments, it is important to keep in mind the basic rules of each.
As previously mentioned, before the 1990 Res Judicata Act, res judicata
precluded an action only when the three identities were met: (1) identity
of cause of action, (2) identity of thing demanded, and (3) identity of
parties. 103 Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 425, as enacted in
1960, prohibited an obligee from dividing an obligation due to him and
provided that an obligee who brought an action demanding only a portion
of the performance of an obligation had waived the right to enforce the
remaining portion. 104
Although few scholarly articles discuss article 425, at least one
Louisiana Supreme Court justice characterized article 425 as an
“exception” to the rules of res judicata, which would preclude a second
action even when the strict identities requirements of res judicata were not
met. 105 In his article discussing the law of res judicata, Justice John Dixon
briefly explained that the article 425 “exception” applied in cases where,
for example, a party injured in a car accident files suit against the other
driver for his personal injuries and then sues the same defendant in a
100. Reed, 324 So. 2d at 488.
101. Id.; Sutterfield, 344 So. 2d 1159; Doyle v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 414
So. 2d 763 (La. 1982); La. Bus. Coll. v. Crump, 474 So. 2d 1366 (La. Ct. App. 2d
Cir. 1985); Preis v. Standard Coffee Serv. Co., 545 So. 2d 1010 (La. 1989).
102. Reed, 324 So. 2d at 488; Sutterfield, 344 So. 2d 1159; Doyle, 414 So. 2d
763; Crump, 474 So. 2d 1366; but see Preis, 545 So. 2d 1010.
103. Kurtz & Frilot, supra note 2, at 445.
104. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 425 (1960).
105. Dixon et al., supra note 9, at 641.
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subsequent action for the damage to his car. 106 In this case, although res
judicata would not apply because there was no identity of the thing
demanded, article 425 would preclude the second suit because both actions
arose from the same obligation, the driver’s tort obligation to repair the
damages he caused to the plaintiff. 107
The Louisiana Supreme Court offered a different interpretation when
it conducted its first in-depth analysis of article 425. 108 In Cantrelle Fence
& Supply Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., after obtaining a judgment against its
uninsured motorist (UM) insurer, the insured plaintiff brought a separate
suit against the UM insurer, seeking penalties and attorney fees pursuant
to Louisiana Revised Statutes § 22:658 because the insurer had allegedly
refused to pay the benefits due. 109 The UM insurer filed an “exception
based on C.C.P. 425.” 110 The Court, offering little explanation for its
interpretation, applied the res judicata definition of “cause”111 to the term
“obligation” in article 425. 112 Using this “theory of recovery” definition of
obligation, the Court concluded that the second suit involved an obligation
arising out of the penalty statute, § 22:658, that was distinct from the
obligation arising out of the contractual relationship under the insurance
policy, and thus article 425 did not preclude the second suit. 113
In Cantrelle, the Louisiana Supreme Court significantly blurred the
lines between article 425 and res judicata. 114 Over time, as courts and
litigants became frustrated with the strict requirements of civilian res
judicata and began construing its requirements more liberally, article 425
and res judicata became more and more intertwined.115

106. Id.; see Richard v. Travelers Ins. Co., 323 So. 2d 176 (La. Ct. App. 3d
Cir. 1975).
107. See Richard, 323 So. 2d 176; Fortenberry v. Clay, 68 So. 2d 133, 134
(La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1953); but see Arbour, supra note 9, at 764.
108. Cantrelle Fence & Supply Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 515 So. 2d 1074, 1076
(La. 1987).
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. See supra text accompanying notes 36–38, where the Louisiana Supreme
Court defined “cause” as “grounds” in Mitchell v. Bertolla, 340 So. 2d 287, 291–
92 (La. 1976).
112. Cantrelle, 515 So. 2d at 1078.
113. Id. at 1079.
114. See generally id.
115. Sutterfield v. Fireman’s Fund Am. Ins. Co., 344 So. 2d 1159 (La. Ct. App.
4th Cir. 1977); Succession of Raziano, 538 So. 2d 1136 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir.
1989).
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3. Article 425 as Amended by the 1990 Res Judicata Act
Although the amended res judicata statute was accompanied by
extensive comments that explained the exact nature of the changes being
made, neither the text nor the comments to the amended article 425 were
particularly clear about the function of the article in light of the expansion
of res judicata. 116 The amended version of article 425, now titled
“Preclusion by judgment,” provides, “A party shall assert all causes of
action arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter
of the litigation.” 117 Notable to the particular issues facilitating the current
circuit split, there is no language in the text of the article itself indicating
an identity-of-parties requirement nor any reference to res judicata. 118 The
comment accompanying the article explains that the amendment expands
the article’s scope “to reflect the changes made in the defense of res
judicata and puts the parties on notice that all causes of action arising out
of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the litigation
must be raised.” 119
Before the 1990 amendments, article 425 primarily functioned as a
flexible claim-preclusion device used in cases where res judicata did not
apply and the court felt that allowing the claim to proceed would be
inequitable. 120 However, once res judicata was expanded, it applied to
those situations in which courts had traditionally used article 425. 121 For
example, under current law, if a party injured in a car accident files suit
against the other driver for his personal injuries and subsequently sues the
same defendant in a separate action for the damage to his car, both actions
undoubtedly arise from the same transaction or occurrence—the car
accident—and are litigated between the same parties. Because res judicata
precludes the second suit, courts are not forced to look elsewhere for
justification to dismiss the action. 122
After the 1990 Act and up until the 2002 Westerman decision, courts
that referred to the new version of article 425 consistently treated the
article as synonymous with res judicata, citing it along with § 13:4231 in
116. See generally LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:4231 (2021); LA. CODE CIV.
PROC. ANN. art. 425 (2021).
117. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 425 (2021).
118. Id.
119. Id. art. 425 cmt. (emphasis added).
120. See supra Sections I.B.1–2.
121. Recall that modern res judicata bars a subsequent suit between the same
parties arising out of the same transaction or occurrence. See supra Section I.A.2.
122. See generally LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:4231 (2021); Richard v.
Travelers Ins. Co., 323 So. 2d 176 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1975).
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response to exceptions of res judicata. 123 In Wood v. May, the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeal explained that before the 1990 Res Judicata Act,
article 425 and § 13:4231 allowed a plaintiff to file a second action for
penalties and attorney fees after a judgment awarding damages against the
same defendant, “based on the theory that the second suit is based on
different causes of action; suit on one obligation did not preclude a later
suit on the other.” 124 The court went on to explain that under the amended
provisions of article 425 and § 13:4231, “although plaintiff's claims for
penalties and attorney’s fees constitute separate causes of action, the
plaintiff must assert all claims that arise out of the same transaction or
occurrence in one action” because “[a]ny additional claim will be barred
by the principles of res judicata.” 125 Here, the court treated article 425 as
a restatement of the rules of res judicata, without an effect independent of
res judicata. 126
Remnants of article 425’s independence, however, continued to
appear in some cases. 127 In Medicus v. Scott, the Second Circuit Court of
Appeal affirmed the lower court’s holding, granting the defendant’s
exception of res judicata. 128 Then, although the defendant had not raised
article 425 as a defense, the court went on to state that the plaintiff’s failure
to raise a claim that arose from the transaction or occurrence amounted to
a waiver of that claim under article 425. 129 Although the court worked
through the article 425 analysis separately, it only used article 425 to
support its holding on the exception of res judicata and did not hold that
the plaintiff’s claim was barred by both article 425 and res judicata. 130 The
slight distinctions made in cases like Medicus left the door open for the
defendant in Westerman to argue for the independence of article 425. 131

123. See Millet v. Crump, 704 So. 2d 305 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 1997); Fine v.
Reg’l Transit Auth., 676 So. 2d 1134 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1996).
124. Wood v. May, 658 So. 2d 8, 9 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1995), rev’d on other
grounds, 663 So. 2d 739 (La. 1995).
125. Id. (emphasis added).
126. Id.
127. See Ensenat v. Edgecombe, 707 So. 2d 1059 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1998).
128. Medicus v. Scott, 744 So. 2d 192, 196–97 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1999).
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. See infra Section II.A.
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II. THE RES JUDICATA REBELLION: A REVIEW OF THE KEY CASES IN THE
CURRENT CIRCUIT SPLIT
Today, the Louisiana Circuit Courts of Appeal are split regarding their
interpretations of article 425 and its relationship to res judicata. 132 The
Spires-Ward-Carollo interpretation, adopted by the Second, Third, and
Fourth circuits, holds that article 425 merely functions to warn litigants of
the effects of res judicata and does not have any independent effect.133
Under the Handy-Westerman interpretation, adopted by the First and Fifth
circuits, article 425 is a distinct concept from res judicata that precludes a
plaintiff from bringing multiple actions arising out of the same transaction
or occurrence, regardless of whether the plaintiff is suing the same
defendant. 134
Note that in each of the cases discussed in the following Section, the
defendant in the second suit raised an objection arguing that the plaintiff
has violated article 425. The Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure does not
provide an official procedural device specifically for asserting a violation
of article 425, and as a result, defendants raising the same argument have
filed different exceptions to do so. 135 Those exceptions are distinct from
an exception raising the objection of res judicata; res judicata did not apply
in any of the following cases, and most of the defendants did not even raise
it as an issue because the parties to each suit were not the same.
A. The First Circuit Interprets Article 425 in Westerman and Finds No
Identity of Parties Required
In Westerman v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., the
Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal held that for a claimant to succeed
132. Spires v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 996 So. 2d 697 (La. Ct. App.
3d Cir. 2008); Ward v. State Dep’t of Transp. & Dev., 2 So. 3d 1231 (La. Ct. App.
2d Cir. 2009); Westerman v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 834 So. 2d 445 (La.
Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2002); Handy v. Par. of Jefferson, 298 So. 3d 380 (La. Ct. App.
5th Cir. 2020); Carollo v. Dep’t of Transp. & Dev., No. 2021-0114, 2021 WL
4785542 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. Oct. 14, 2021).
133. Spires, 996 So. 2d 697; Ward, 2 So. 3d 1231; Carollo, 2021 WL 4785542.
134. Westerman, 834 So. 2d 445; Handy, 298 So. 3d 380.
135. In Westerman, the defendant filed a peremptory exception “raising an
objection of preclusion by judgment” under article 425. 834 So. 2d at 446. In
Spires, the defendant filed an “exception of preclusion by judgment.” 996 So. 2d
at 698. In Ward, the defendant filed a peremptory exception of no cause of action.
2 So. 3d at 1233. In Handy and Carollo, the defendants filed peremptory
exceptions of no right of action under article 425. Handy, 298 So. 3d at 385;
Carollo, 2021 WL 4785542, at *3.
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on an objection under article 425, the only requirement is that the claim in
the current lawsuit must arise out of the same transaction or occurrence as
a previous lawsuit, regardless of whether the two lawsuits are between the
same parties. 136 Following a car accident, the plaintiff in Westerman filed
suit against the other driver, the owner of the other vehicle, and the vehicle
owner’s insurer, American Deposit Insurance Company (American
Deposit). 137 After the court ruled in favor of the plaintiff, rendering a
judgment for damages in the amount of $20,000, the parties reached a
compromise whereby American Deposit paid its $10,000 policy limit, and
the plaintiff dismissed her claim with prejudice. 138 Thereafter, the plaintiff
filed a second suit against her UM insurer, State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Company (State Farm), seeking to recover for her accident
damages that exceeded the American Deposit policy limits. 139
State Farm filed a peremptory exception raising an “objection of
preclusion by judgment” under article 425. 140 State Farm argued that the
plaintiff’s claim was barred because plaintiff did not assert it in her first
suit, which arose out of the same transaction or occurrence as the UM
claim, and that “[t]he interests of justice, the traditional notions of fair
play, and judicial economy do not permit the same issues being re-litigated
over and over so as to accommodate a plaintiff in multiple causes of action
against different defendants.” 141 The trial court granted State Farm’s
exception and dismissed the plaintiff’s case with prejudice. 142 The
plaintiff, relying on several pre-1990 cases, argued on appeal that the two
suits were separate causes of action, one based in tort and the other in
contract, that arose out of two different transactions or occurrences, the car
accident and the contract of insurance.143
After analyzing case law from both before and after the 1990 Res
Judicata Act, the First Circuit determined that the focus of the prior version
of article 425 was to prevent plaintiffs from dividing a single obligation
for the purpose of bringing separate actions. 144 However, because the 1990
Res Judicata Act “expand[ed] the scope” of article 425, the court reasoned
136. Westerman, 834 So. 2d at 448.
137. Id. at 445.
138. Id. at 445–46.
139. Id. at 446.
140. Id. State Farm had also filed several other exceptions, including the
exception of res judicata, but the trial court did not address these exceptions and
instead ruled only on the preclusion under article 425. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 447.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 447–48.
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that the new function of the article was to require litigants to assert separate
causes of action that arise out of the same transaction or occurrence in the
same action. 145 Thus, even though the plaintiff’s claims were based on
separate causes of action and asserted against different parties, they
“clearly” arose from the same occurrence, the car accident. 146
Consequently, the plaintiff’s failure to assert the UM claim in the first
action amounted to a waiver of that claim. 147 The First Circuit accordingly
affirmed the holding of the trial court granting State Farm’s exception
under article 425 and dismissed the plaintiff’s second suit. 148

145. Id. at 448 (quoting LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 425 cmt. (2021)).
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. Four years after it decided Westerman, the First Circuit issued another
holding that debatably conflicts with Westerman in Butler v. United States Auto.
Ass’n Ins. Co., 928 So.2d 53 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2005). In Butler, the court cited
two Third Circuit cases, discussed infra note 149, and stated that article 425 “is
merely a reference to the principles of res judicata.” Id. at 55 (first citing Walker
v. Howell, 896 So. 2d 110, 112 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2004); and then citing
Gaspard v. Allstate Ins. Co., 903 So. 2d 518 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2005)).
However, instead of ruling that the plaintiff’s case could proceed because the
identity-of-parties requirement was not met, the court held that res judicata did
not apply because, “unlike in Westerman,” the judgment in the first suit
specifically reserved the plaintiff’s right against the defendant in the second suit,
thereby satisfying the exception to the res judicata rules in § 13:4232(A)(3). Id.
This holding is particularly perplexing given that the Westerman opinion never
even noted whether the plaintiff in that case had reserved her right against the
defendant in the second suit. See generally Westerman, 834 So. 2d 445.
Unsurprisingly, subsequent cases disagree about the significance of Butler. In
Handy, the Fifth Circuit stated:
I do not read the Butler decision as a departure from Westerman except
to the extent specifically stated in the opinion, i.e., Butler involved a
reservation of rights and Westerman did not. The Butler opinion includes
language from Walker and Gaspard equating Article 425 preclusion with
res judicata, but the Butler court did not base its ruling that the second
action could proceed on the fact that the parties to the two actions were
not the same.
Handy v. Par. of Jefferson, 298 So. 3d 380, 390 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 2020). But
in Carollo, the Fourth Circuit explained that the Butler opinion “clarified that
Article 425 should be read in conjunction with the res judicata articles.” Carollo
v. Dep’t of Transp. & Dev., No. 2021-0114, 2021 WL 4785542, at *9 (La. Ct.
App. 4th Cir. Oct. 14, 2021). Because the First Circuit did not explicitly overrule
Westerman in Butler, this Comment assumes that the First Circuit continues to
follow the Handy-Westerman interpretation.
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B. The Third Circuit Rejects the Westerman Analysis in Spires
In Spires v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., the
Louisiana Third Circuit Court of Appeal found that article 425 is “merely
a reference to the principles of res judicata” and thus only applies to
actions between the same parties. 149 After a car accident, the plaintiffs in
Spires filed suit against the other driver and the other driver’s liability
insurer, seeking damages from the accident. 150 After settling with the
liability insurer of the defendant-driver in that suit, the plaintiffs filed a
second suit against their UM insurer, State Farm. 151 State Farm filed an
“exception of preclusion by judgment,” arguing that the plaintiffs had
waived their cause of action against State Farm when they failed to assert
it in the first lawsuit because article 425 required plaintiffs to assert all
causes of action arising out of the transaction or occurrence, the car
accident. 152 Relying on the First Circuit’s earlier decision in Westerman,
the trial court granted State Farm’s exception and dismissed the case. 153
The plaintiffs appealed to the Third Circuit.154
Because the 1990 Res Judicata Act amended both article 425 and the
res judicata statute, the Third Circuit reasoned that the two provisions must
be read and interpreted in pari materia. 155 The court interpreted the
article’s lack of a penalty provision as evidence that article 425 is not an
independent claim-preclusion device but instead merely functions as “a
reference to the principles of res judicata.” 156 Thus, the court analyzed
State Farm’s exception using the rules of res judicata and concluded that
because State Farm was not the same party as the other driver or her

149. Spires v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 996 So. 2d 697, 700 (La. Ct.
App. 3d Cir. 2008) (emphasis removed). It is worth noting that the Third Circuit
had previously analyzed the article 425 issue in Walker, 896 So. 2d 110 and had
directly ruled on the issue in Gaspard, 903 So. 2d 518. However, those decisions
used the same reasoning and less analysis than Spires, so Spires is the only Third
Circuit opinion discussed in full in this Comment.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 698.
153. Id. at 699.
154. Id.
155. Id. Laws on the same subject matter, or in pari materia, must be
interpreted in reference to each other. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 13 (2021).
156. Spires, 996 So. 2d at 700 (quoting Gaspard v. Allstate Ins. Co., 903 So.
2d 518, 520 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2005)).
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insurer, res judicata did not apply. 157 The Third Circuit denied State
Farm’s exception and reversed the judgment of the trial court. 158
C. The Second Circuit Affirms the Spires Interpretation in Ward
Less than three months later, the Louisiana Second Circuit Court of
Appeal addressed article 425’s applicability to lawsuits arising out of the
same transaction or occurrence but between different parties in Ward v.
State, Department of Transportation and Development. 159 In Ward, the
plaintiffs filed two lawsuits for the same damages arising from the same
car accident. 160 The first suit involved a claim of improper road
maintenance against the State Department of Transportation and
Development (DOTD). 161 The next day, the plaintiffs filed the second suit,
in which they named as defendants the other driver and the other driver’s
insurer, United Services Automobile Association (USAA). 162 USAA filed
a third suit, seeking a concursus proceeding for all damages arising from
the accident and naming the Wards, among others, as defendants. 163
DOTD, however, was not a party to this concursus proceeding. 164 After a
consent judgment was entered in the concursus proceeding, the plaintiffs
dismissed the second suit against the other driver. 165 Thereafter, DOTD
filed an exception of no cause of action in the first suit, contending that
under article 425, the judgments in the other two suits extinguished and
precluded the plaintiffs’ claims against DOTD. 166 The trial court sustained
the exception and dismissed the claims against DOTD with prejudice, and
the plaintiffs appealed. 167
After reviewing Spires and related Third Circuit jurisprudence, 168 the
Second Circuit reversed the trial court’s judgment dismissing the suit
against DOTD, finding that article 425 “operates in tandem” with the res

157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Ward v. State, Dep’t of Transp. & Dev., 2 So. 3d 1231, 1233 (La. Ct.
App. 2d Cir. 2009).
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. See cases cited note 149.
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judicata statutes. 169 The court held that article 425 is merely a reference to
res judicata, and as such, an exception of res judicata is the proper
procedural vehicle to enforce article 425’s mandate of asserting all claims
arising out of the same transaction or occurrence in one lawsuit.170 noting
that DOTD would have been an improper party in the concursus
proceeding in the prior suit. 171 Accordingly, the court analyzed DOTD’s
exception under the rules of res judicata and——found that the plaintiff’s
second lawsuit did not preclude plaintiff’s initial action against DOTD,
because the parties to the two lawsuits were not the same. 172
D. The Fifth Circuit Revives the Westerman Analysis in Handy
Eighteen years after the First Circuit decided Westerman, the
Louisiana Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal rejected the Spires-Ward
interpretation and held that although article 425 and res judicata are
related, article 425 is a distinct claim-preclusion device that only requires
that the causes of action in two suits arise from the same transaction or
occurrence to preclude a second lawsuit.173 In Handy v. Parish of
Jefferson, the plaintiff filed two actions concurrently, one against over 30
asbestos manufacturers and sellers in the Orleans Parish Civil District
Court and the other against Jefferson Parish in the 24th Judicial District
Court. 174 Both lawsuits sought to recover damages caused by the plaintiff’s
alleged occupational exposure to asbestos. 175 Following the conclusion of
the Orleans lawsuit, Jefferson Parish filed a peremptory exception raising
the objection of no right of action under article 425. 176 The trial court
applied the Spires-Ward interpretation and analyzed this exception using
169. Ward, 2 So. 3d at 1234.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 1235. A concursus proceeding is one in which two or more persons
having competing or conflicting claims to money, property, or mortgages or
privileges on property are impleaded and required to assert their respective claims
contradictorily against all other parties to the proceeding. LA. CODE CIV. PROC.
ANN. art. 4651 (2021). In this concursus proceeding, it would have been improper
to third-party DOTD, who was not a potential claimant to the money from the
USAA insurance policy. Ward, 2 So. 3d at 1235.
172. Id.
173. Handy v. Par. of Jefferson, 298 So. 3d 380, 390 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir.
2020).
174. Id. Louisiana Revised Statutes § 13:5104 requires suits against a political
subdivision of the state to be filed in the judicial district where the political
subdivision is located. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:5104 (2021).
175. Handy, 298 So. 3d at 383.
176. Id. at 385.
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the rules of res judicata embodied in § 13:4232. Although the two actions
arose out of the same transaction or occurrence, the court denied the
Parish’s exception because the two suits were not between the same
parties. 177 The Parish appealed to the Fifth Circuit. 178
On appeal, the Parish argued that the plain language of article 425 does
not require two suits to be between the same parties to preclude the second
suit and thus, that the trial court erred in reading this requirement into the
article. 179 The Parish also claimed that allowing the plaintiffs to proceed
against the Parish as the lone defendant in a separate lawsuit would be
unduly burdensome, as doing so would require the Parish to independently
establish the potential fault of dozens of non-parties. 180 In response, the
plaintiffs argued that the trial court was correct in reading article 425 in
pari materia with the res judicata statutes and that because article 425 does
not contain a penalty provision, its application should “yield to the
interests of justice.” 181 The plaintiffs contended that the Parish’s reliance
on the First Circuit’s Westerman analysis was misplaced, as most courts
had “‘essentially’ abandoned” the First Circuit’s interpretation. 182
Relying on the plain language of article 425, the Fifth Circuit found
that interpreting article 425 as distinct from res judicata is consistent with
the article’s language and the article’s purposes of maximizing judicial
economy; minimizing conflicting judgments; and preventing harassment,
delay, and unnecessary expense to a defendant. 183 The court cited the First
Circuit’s Westerman analysis in approval of construing article 425 “in
conjunction with” the principles of res judicata without treating the two as
identical. 184 Relying on the civil law rule that “it is not the function of a
court to create legislation, but rather to interpret it,” the Fifth Circuit
rejected the Spires-Ward analysis as essentially rewriting article 425. 185
177. Id. at 383.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 383–84.
181. Id. at 384 (citing Breaux v. Avondale Indus., Inc., 842 So. 2d 1115, 1117
(La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 2003)).
182. Id.
183. Id. at 390.
184. Id. (“the fact that different provisions of law are related does not
necessarily mean that they are synonymous or identical in scope”).
185. Id. at 391 (first citing Tullier v. Tullier, 464 So. 2d 278, 282 (La. 1985);
and then citing Rada v. Adm’r, Div. of Emp. Sec., 319 So. 2d 460, 463 (La. Ct.
App. 4th Cir. 1975)) (“If the wording of a statute is not ambiguous but the
legislature erred in expressing its intention, any such error should be corrected by
the legislature.”).
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Thus, the court granted the exception of no right of action, and dismissed
plaintiffs’ suit. 186 The Fifth Circuit’s holding has sparked new litigation in
which defendants raise article 425 as a shield to suits against plaintiffs who
split their claims. 187
E. The Fourth Circuit Agrees with the Second and Third Circuits in
Carollo
In Carollo v. Department of Transportation and Development, the
family of decedents killed in a car accident filed suit against the driver of
the other vehicle, the other driver’s employer, and the employer’s insurer
in state court. 188 The defendants had the suit removed to federal court
based on diversity jurisdiction. 189 The plaintiffs filed a motion for leave to
file a supplemental and amended petition to add DOTD as a defendant, but
the magistrate denied the motion, and the federal district court affirmed. 190
Thereafter, the parties reached a settlement agreement in which the
plaintiffs reserved their rights against all other parties. 191
The next day, the plaintiffs filed a petition in the state district court,
naming DOTD as the only defendant. 192 DOTD filed an exception of no
right of action “based on preclusion of judgment, pursuant to La. C.C.P.
art. 425,” 193 contending that the plaintiffs violated article 425 by filing a
separate suit against DOTD that arose out of the same transaction and
occurrence as alleged in the federal suit. 194 DOTD argued that “this case
presents the very situation in which the preclusion by judgment doctrine
should apply.” 195 Interestingly, instead of arguing that article 425 was not
a separate preclusion device from res judicata, the plaintiffs argued that
article 425 “was not absolute and ‘will yield to the interest of justice.’”
According to the plaintiffs, therefore, article 425 did not preclude their suit
against DOTD because the plaintiffs were not aware of DOTD’s alleged
liability before filing the first suit; DOTD was not amenable to the
186. Id. at 384.
187. Carollo v. Dep’t of Transp. & Dev., No. 2021-0114, 2021 WL 4785542
(La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. Oct. 14, 2021); Saed v, Harvey, No. 21-399, 2022 WL
709824 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. Mar. 9, 2022).
188. Carollo, 2021 WL 4785542, at *1.
189. Id.
190. Id. at *3.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id. at *1.
194. Id. at *3.
195. Id. at *5.
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jurisdiction of the federal court, where the plaintiffs were forced to litigate;
and the plaintiffs had reserved their rights against DOTD in the prior
settlement agreement. 196 The district court rejected the plaintiffs’
arguments and granted DOTD’s exception, citing the “extreme prejudice”
that would result against DOTD if the suit were allowed to proceed, as
DOTD “would be required to independently establish the potential fault of
the now dismissed defendants from the Federal Litigation.” 197 The
plaintiffs appealed to the Fourth Circuit, again arguing that article 425
should yield to the interest of justice under the circumstances. 198
At the beginning of its analysis, the Fourth Circuit noted that it had
been faced with an argument that article 425 was its own preclusion device
that did not require identify of parties in Breaux v. Avondale Industries,
Inc. 199 However, in deciding that case, the court “did not discuss that the
res judicata element of identity between the parties was not met; instead,
this Court cited [the] ‘in the interest of justice’ exception to res judicata,”
which is located in § 13:4232(A)(1) and the related comments. 200 The
Fourth Circuit further noted in Carollo that both parties had agreed that
“the exceptions to res judicata may be applied to the mandate of article
425.” 201
After reviewing other relevant caselaw, the Fourth Circuit, “persuaded
by the [T]hird [C]ircuit’s approach” in Spires, ruled that “all the elements
of res judicata must be met to preclude a claim or action under La. C.C.P.

196. Id. at *4. In support of their contention that there is an “in the interest of
justice” exception to article 425, the plaintiffs cited Craig v. Adams Interiors, Inc.,
785 So. 2d 997 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 2001), a case in which the Second Circuit
treated article 425 and res judicata as synonymous and denied an exception of res
judicata “pursuant to [article] 425” in the interests of justice.
197. Carollo, 2021 WL 4785542, at *4.
198. Id. at *5. The plaintiffs also argued at the district court and at the Fourth
Circuit that their claim against DOTD had not prescribed because prescription
against DOTD was interrupted by the filing of the first suit. Id. at *4, *5 n.3.
However, the district court did not rule on the issue, and as a result the issue was
not properly before the Fourth Circuit. Id.
199. Id. at *7 (citing Breaux v. Avondale Indus., Inc., 842 So. 2d 1115 (La. Ct.
App. 4th Cir. 2003)).
200. Id. “A judgment does not bar another action by the plaintiff: (1) When
exceptional circumstances justify relief from the res judicata effect of the
judgment.” LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:4232(A)(1) (2021). The comments to the
statute note that the discretion granted by this exception to res judicata “is
necessary to allow the court to balance the principle of res judicata with the
interests of justice.” Id. § 13:4232(A)(1) cmt. a.
201. Carollo, 2021 WL 4785542, at *7.
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art. 425.” 202 The Fourth Circuit explained that to rule that article 425
should be strictly construed as its own claim-preclusion device that only
requires one of the res judicata elements—that the claim arose out of the
same transaction or occurrence—would “result in abrogating the res
judicata statutes and its supporting jurisprudence.” 203 Applying its holding
to the case at hand, the court reversed the holding of the district court,
thereby denying DOTD’s exception of no right of action and allowing
plaintiffs’ case to proceed. 204
The current circuit split mirrors the confusion surrounding article 425
before the 1990 amendments. Yet again, courts have started to look to
article 425 as a catchall claim-preclusion device to use when faced with a
claim to which res judicata does not apply but that the court believes would
be unjust to allow to proceed. 205 Indeed, there are several valid policy
arguments that support adoption of the Handy-Westerman rule. Allowing
plaintiffs to sue joint tortfeasors separately is inconsistent with the
judicial-efficiency, protection-of-defendants, and correctness-ofjudgments rationales of res judicata and claim preclusion in general. 206
Reestablishing the same underlying facts and legal questions arising from
the same transaction or occurrence wastes judicial resources; requiring
defendants to litigate separately rather than presenting a unified defense
can be burdensome; and allowing plaintiffs a second opportunity to litigate
the same claims, just against a different party, could result in inconsistent
judgments. 207 This last point is especially compelling given Louisiana’s
pure comparative-fault regime; two different juries could allocate fault
differently among the defendants and award different amounts of
damages, especially in cases involving damages that are difficult to
quantify, such as emotional distress. 208 Perhaps as courts and litigants
become frustrated with the shortcomings of our modern version of res
judicata in cases like Handy, the legislature will consider expanding the
202. Id. at *10.
203. Id.
204. Id. at *11.
205. Handy v. Par. of Jefferson, 298 So. 3d 380, 390 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir.
2020); Westerman v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 834 So. 2d 445 (La. Ct.
App. 1st Cir. 2002).
206. M.W.K., supra note 3, at 471.
207. Id.
208. See generally id. (explaining that “the same logical difficulty exists in the
joint wrong-doer cases, for the second defendant, who is being sued for a wrong
identical to that of the first defendant, will be found guilty of a wrong already
declared non-existent. Technically, of course, his wrong has not been tried before,
but the identical facts that will establish his guilt have been . . . .”).
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scope of res judicata by eliminating the identity-of-parties requirement.
However, as discussed below, the implementation of a claim-preclusion
device without an identity-of-parties requirement was not the intent of the
legislature when it amended article 425 in the 1990 Res Judicata Act. 209
III. RESOLVING THE CIRCUIT SPLIT: A LEGISLATIVE SOLUTION
A proper statutory interpretation reveals that the Second, Third, and
Fourth circuits in the Spires-Ward-Corollo line of cases correctly
interpreted the legislature’s intent for the amended article 425 to function
as a reference to res judicata, without any independent enforcement effect.
However, as the First and Fifth circuits concluded, article 425’s plain
language contains no indication of such relationship, and this
inconsistency has understandably led these two circuit courts to interpret
article 425 as an independent claim-preclusion device. The unnecessary
duplication in the law is the root of the problem that has led to the current
circuit split. Thus, in order to resolve the inconsistency between the plain
language and intent and to avoid future confusion, the legislature should
repeal article 425 and move the res judicata statutes—§§ 13:4231 and
4232—into the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure.
A. Statutory Interpretation
Beginning by looking to the plain language, 210 article 425 paragraph
A states the article’s general rule, while paragraph B provides an exception
to this rule. 211 Similarly, § 13:4231 states the general rule of res judicata,
while § 13:4232 provides a number of exceptions to this rule. 212 In
analyzing the plain language of article 425 and the res judicata statutes, it
makes sense to first compare the general rule in article 425(A) to the
general rule in § 13:4231, and then the exception in article 425(B) to the
exceptions in § 13:4232.

209. See infra Section III.A. For a further discussion of the practical
implications of a rule requiring plaintiffs to sue joint tortfeasors in the same suit,
see Comment, Consequences of Proceeding Separately Against Concurrent
Tortfeasors, 68 HARV. L. REV. 697 (1955).
210. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 9 (2021) (“When a law is clear and unambiguous
and its application does not lead to absurd consequences, the law shall be applied
as written and no further interpretation may be made in search of the intent of the
legislature.”).
211. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 425 (2021).
212. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:4232 (2021).
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Article 425(A) does not explicitly state an identity-of-parties
requirement or contain a reference to res judicata.213 In fact, the only
analogous language in § 13:4231 and article 425(A) is the “transaction or
occurrence” phrase, which is a common standard in civil procedure
articles. 214 Outside of this phrase, the two laws are significantly
different. 215 While § 13:4231 differentiates between its effects on
plaintiffs and defendants, article 425’s language refers to parties generally
without specifying different rules for each. 216 Additionally, § 13:4231 is
written in terms of the preclusive effects of a lawsuit after a final judgment,
but article 425 is written as a rule for parties to follow during litigation. 217
Further, the res judicata statute incorporates a form of issue preclusion, but
there is no language to support any rule of issue preclusion in article
425. 218
The exceptions to each rule contain further inconsistencies in the plain
language of article 425 and res judicata. Paragraph A of § 13:4232 lists
three of the four exceptions to the general rule of res judicata, 219 and
paragraph B provides the fourth and final exception, which involves
specific provisions relating to actions for divorce. 220 In contrast, the only
exception listed in article 425 is in paragraph B, which lists the same
specific exceptions relating to actions for divorce, using almost identical
language, as those listed in paragraph B of § 13:4232. 221 If the legislature
intended article 425 to merely reference all of the rules, requirements, and
exceptions of the res judicata statutes, there would be no need to list this
divorce exception in article 425 because it is already included in the res
judicata statutes. However, it is important to note that both paragraph B of
213. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 425 (2021).
214. See, e.g., LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. arts. 891, 531, and 532 (2021).
215. See generally Handy v. Par. of Jefferson, 298 So. 3d 380 (La. Ct. App.
5th Cir. 2020).
216. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:4231(1)–(2) (2021); LA. CODE CIV. PROC.
ANN. art. 425 (2021).
217. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:4231 (2021); LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art.
425 (2021).
218. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:4231(3) (2021); LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN.
art. 425 (2021). Issue preclusion under § 13:4231 prevents litigants from
relitigating specific issues that have been determined in a previous action between
the same parties arising out of a separate transaction or occurrence.
219. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:4232(A) (2021). The exceptions are (1) when
exceptional circumstances justify relief from the effect of res judicata; (2) when
the judgment dismissed the first action without prejudice; or (3) when the
judgment reserved the right of the plaintiff to bring another action.
220. Id. § 13:4232(B).
221. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 425(B) (2021).
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§ 13:4232 and paragraph B of article 425 were added a year after the 1990
Res Judicata Act as part of an act addressing procedural problems with
actions for divorce, so the legislature’s focus at that point was likely not
on preserving the framework of res judicata. 222
It is illogical that two rules that are so substantively inconsistent could
be synonymous. 223 If article 425 is meant to act as a broad codal reference
to the specific statutory rules of res judicata, the language of the two laws
should not conflict, yet significant distinctions exist between the two. 224
From a strict textualist standpoint, therefore, the First and Fifth circuits
correctly interpreted article 425 as a distinct claim-preclusion device from
res judicata. A strict textual analysis of this sort, however, adheres to the
letter of the law without properly considering the legislative intent.225
When the legislature passed the 1990 Res Judicata Act, it included
comments on each article and statute that was part of the Act.226 The
comment accompanying the amendment to article 425 essentially repeats
the exact language of the article and offers virtually no guidance on
whether article 425 is merely a reference to res judicata or an independent
preclusion device. 227 The first half of the comment simply states, “This
amendment expands the scope of this Article to reflect the changes made
in the defense of res judicata . . . .” 228 Although the Second, Third, and
Fourth circuits relied on this comment’s mention of res judicata as support
for their interpretation that article 425 is merely a reference to res
judicata, 229 the comments to three other code articles amended as part of
the 1990 Res Judicata Act use the same or very similar language.230 And
these articles, which govern lis pendens and the form of petitions, are
222. See generally Act No. 367, §§ 2–3, 1991 La. Acts 1304.
223. See generally Handy v. Par. of Jefferson, 298 So. 3d 380 (La. Ct. App.
5th Cir. 2020).
224. Westerman v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 834 So. 2d 445 (La. Ct.
App. 1st Cir. 2002); Handy, 298 So. 3d 380.
225. See generally Ward v. State, Dep’t of Transp. & Dev., 2 So. 3d 1231 (La.
Ct. App. 2d Cir. 2009).
226. Act No. 521, 1990 La. Acts 1174.
227. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 425 cmt. (1990).
228. Id.
229. Spires v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 996 So. 2d 697 (La. Ct. App.
3d Cir. 2008); Ward, 2 So. 3d 1231; Carollo v. Dep’t of Transp. & Dev., No.
2021-0114, 2021 WL 4785542, at *10 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. Oct. 14, 2021).
230. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 891 cmt. (1990) (“to reflect the changes
made in the defense of res judicata”); id. art. 531 cmt. (“to conform to the changes
made in the defense of res judicata”); id. art. 532 cmt. (“to conform to the changes
made in the defense of res judicata”).
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clearly not mere references to res judicata. 231 The amendments to these
articles simply updated the language to apply the new res judicata standard
of same “transaction or occurrence” instead of “cause of action.” 232
The First and Fifth circuits focused solely on the first half of the
comment, concluding that the amendment to article 425 simply expanded
its scope from “an obligation” to a “transaction or occurrence,” just as the
other articles expanded from “cause of action” to “transaction or
occurrence.” 233 However, the First and Fifth circuits failed to address the
other changes made to article 425 by the 1990 Res Judicata Act and the
second half of article 425’s comment.
As explained by the Second, Third, and Fourth circuits in the SpiresWard-Carollo line of cases, article 425 does not contain a penalty
provision or a mechanism for enforcement of its rule. 234 This lack of a
penalty provision is significant because the 1960 version of article 425 did
contain a penalty, providing that an obligor who split his cause of action
waived his right to enforce the remaining portion. 235 The fact that the
legislature chose to remove this language suggests that the legislature did
not intend the amended version of article 425 to have its own enforcement
power. 236 In further support of their position, the Second and Third circuits
looked to the second half of the comment accompanying the amendment
to article 425, which explains that article 425 puts parties “on notice that
all causes of action arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the
subject matter of the litigation must be raised.” 237 Reading the lack of
penalty provision with the “on notice” language in the comment, the
Second, Third, and Fourth circuits concluded that article 425 has no force
independent of res judicata and is merely a warning or reference to res
judicata. 238 However, as discussed above, this interpretation is inconsistent

231. See generally supra Section I.A.2.
232. See generally supra Section I.A.2.
233. Westerman v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 834 So. 2d 445 (La. Ct.
App. 1st Cir. 2002); Handy v. Par. of Jefferson, 298 So. 3d 380 (La. Ct. App. 5th
Cir. 2020).
234. Spires v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 996 So. 2d 697, 700 (La. Ct.
App. 3d Cir. 2008); Ward v. State, Dep’t of Transp. & Dev., 2 So. 3d 1231, 1234
(La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 2009); Carollo v. Dep’t of Transp. & Dev., No. 2021-0114,
2021 WL 4785542, at *6 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. Oct. 14, 2021).
235. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 425 (1960).
236. Spires, 996 So. 2d at 700.
237. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 425 cmt. (1990) (emphasis added).
238. See Spires, 996 So. 2d at 700. Ward, 2 So. 3d at 1235; Carollo, 2021 WL
4785542, at *10.

2022]

COMMENT

1215

with the plain language, so further evidence of the legislative intent is
necessary to overcome this plain-language analysis.
Interpreting article 425 as an independent claim-preclusion device that
does not require identity of parties, as suggested by the First and Fifth
circuits, would render the laws on res judicata obsolete. 239 It would be
illogical for the legislature to amend res judicata to require (1) same
transaction or occurrence and (2) identity of parties, and then in the same
act expand the scope of article 425 to require only (1) same transaction or
occurrence. If this interpretation prevails, defendants will almost always
choose to raise an objection based on article 425 rather than res judicata. 240
Reading article 425 in pari materia with other Code of Civil Procedure
articles also gives insight into the legislature’s intent. Article 463, which
governs cumulation of actions with multiple plaintiffs or defendants, states
that “[t]wo or more parties may be joined in the same suit, either as
plaintiffs or as defendants . . . .” 241 A permissive rule on joining defendants
in the same suit would be inconsistent with an interpretation of article 425
that requires all claims arising out of the transaction or occurrence, even
those against nonparties, to also be asserted in one suit. Moreover, article
643 provides that “one or more solidary obligors may be sued to enforce a
solidary obligation, without the necessity of joining all others in the
action.” 242 If solidary obligors (who are each liable for the whole of an
obligation) need not be joined in the same action, then, a fortiori ratione,
joint and divisible obligors (who are each only liable for their own portion
of the obligation) certainly need not be joined in one action. 243 This
analysis undermines the First and Fifth circuits’ interpretation, but it does
not directly support the opposing interpretation of the Second, Third, and
Fourth circuits.
When the proposal for the 1990 Res Judicata Act was presented to the
Louisiana House of Representatives, the House assigned the bill to the
Civil Law and Procedure Committee for review. 244 At the committee’s
meeting, Professor Howard L’Enfant, representing the Louisiana State
Law Institute, described the main purpose of Senate Bill No. 639 as
changing the law so that “res judicata focus[es] on the underlying
transaction or occurrence” instead of the underlying cause. 245 He further
239. See Carollo, 2021 WL 4785542, at *10.
240. See id.
241. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 463 (2021) (emphasis added).
242. Id. art. 643.
243. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2324 (2021).
244. Minutes of Meeting, Civ. L. & Proc. Comm. 11 (June 18, 1990) (on file
with the Louisiana Senate Docket).
245. Id.
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explained that “the provisions in R.S. 13:4231 and R.S. 13:4232 are the
fundamental changes [to] the law” in the act. 246 Through these statements,
Professor L’Enfant was clear that the primary purpose of this act was to
reform the law on res judicata. 247 Even more relevant, when questioned
about the effect of article 425, Professor L’Enfant described the article as
an “admonition” 248 and stated that the effect of article 425 “will come from
R.S. 13:4231 and 13:4232.” 249 He explained that article 425 “warns
litigants that res judicata will bar their claims so they must assert all causes
of action.” 250 Professor L’Enfant’s explanation confirms the Spires-WardCorollo interpretation that article 425 serves only as a warning of the
effects of res judicata, with its force coming from the res judicata statutes.
However, as discussed above, the plain language of the article does not
represent this intention. Because the plain language of the article conflicts
with the intent of the legislature, a legislative solution is necessary to
correct the discrepancy.
B. A Simple Legislative Solution
Two Louisiana Circuit Courts of Appeal have interpreted article 425
to be a distinct claim-preclusion device that does not require the parties in
each suit to be the same for a claim to be precluded. 251 This HandyWesterman interpretation fundamentally diverges from claim-preclusion
law in Louisiana by allowing defendants to avail themselves of a judgment
to which they were not a party. As stated by the Fifth Circuit in Handy, “it
is not the function of a court to create legislation, but rather to interpret
it.” 252 To resolve this ambiguity, the legislature should repeal article 425
and move the res judicata statutes to the Louisiana Code of Civil
Procedure.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Id. at 12. See Merriam-Webster, Admonition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER
DICTIONARY (2020) (“gentle or friendly reproof;” “counsel or warning against
fault or oversight”).
249. Minutes of Meeting, supra note 244, at 12.
250. Id. (emphasis added).
251. Westerman v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 834 So. 2d 445 (La. Ct.
App. 1st Cir. 2002); Handy v. Par. of Jefferson, 298 So. 3d 380 (La. Ct. App. 5th
Cir. 2020).
252. Handy, 298 So. 3d at 391 (first citing Tullier v. Tullier, 464 So. 2d 278,
282 (La. 1985); and then citing Rada v. Adm’r, Div. of Emp’t Sec., 319 So. 2d
460, 463 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1975)) (“If the wording of a statute is not
ambiguous but the legislature erred in expressing its intention, any such error
should be corrected by the legislature.”).
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The First and Fifth circuits have interpreted article 425 to be a distinct
claim-preclusion device because, simply stated, it appears to be one. 253
The text of the article looks very different from that of the res judicata
statute § 13:4231, does not require the causes of action to be between the
parties to the litigation, and makes no reference to res judicata.254 In
addition to the discrepancies in the plain language, article 425 historically
acted as a distinct claim-preclusion device that had different requirements
from res judicata. 255 Since the expanded law of res judicata now precludes
actions that were previously only precluded by article 425, 256 the article
no longer serves its original purpose, and the confusion can be resolved by
repealing article 425.
However, res judicata is a highly important concept in Louisiana’s
civil procedure law, and as such, it should be included in the Code of Civil
Procedure. 257 The res judicata statutes do not belong in their current
location in Revised Statutes Title 13: Courts and Judicial Procedure,
Chapter 23: Judgments. 258 The statutes in Title 13 are highly specific rules,
mostly regarding the minute mechanics of civil procedure. 259 For example,
the statutes in Part I of Chapter 23 govern payment of court costs and fees
and the procedures for judges to follow when court is not in session or if a
judge dies while presiding over a case. 260 Res judicata is a general
principle that governs litigants’ rights to bring their claims and to be free
from vexatious litigation.261 It is such an important, universal concept that
it is specifically named as a peremptory exception to defeat a cause of
action in Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 927. 262 Yet the general
rules governing res judicata itself are the only part of the res judicata
framework that is not in the Code of Civil Procedure. 263 The current
designation of the rules governing res judicata is illogical and inconsistent
with the nature of res judicata, the Code of Civil Procedure, and the
Revised Statutes.

253. Westerman, 834 So. 2d 445; Handy, 298 So. 3d 380.
254. See supra Section III.A.1.
255. See supra Section I.B.
256. See supra Section I.B.3.
257. Kurtz & Frilot, supra note 2, at 445.
258. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:4231 (2021).
259. See generally id. tit. 13.
260. See generally id. §§ 13:4201–4211.
261. Id. § 13:4231.
262. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 927 (2021).
263. See generally Act No. 521, 1990 La. Acts 1174; Kurtz & Frilot, supra
note 2, at 445.
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Article 425 is located in the Code of Civil Procedure in Book I: Courts,
Actions, and Parties; Title II: Actions; Chapter 1: General Dispositions. 264
The other chapters in Title II govern cumulation of actions, lis pendens,
abandonment of action, and class and derivative actions. 265 Cumulation
governs the rules on bringing separate causes of action and separate parties
into the same litigation. 266 Lis pendens allows a defendant to have a case
dismissed or stayed if the plaintiff has instituted two actions arising out of
the same transaction or occurrence against him that are pending at the
same time. 267 Additionally, the chapter on general dispositions includes
articles on prematurity, heritability of actions, and other central principles
affecting the rights of parties in regard to bringing actions. 268 The rules on
res judicata logically belong in this title because res judicata is also a
central principle that affects parties’ rights in bringing and defending
against causes of action. 269
Because the duplication of the rules on res judicata causes confusion
among Louisiana Circuit Courts of Appeal, the legislature should repeal
article 425. However, because res judicata is an important principle of civil
procedure, it needs to be represented in the Code of Civil Procedure. Thus,
the legislature should repeal §§ 13:4231 and 4232, which provide the rules
of res judicata, and redesignate them as two articles in their own chapter,
entitled “Res Judicata,” in Book I, Title II of the Code of Civil Procedure,
which is where article 425 is currently located. The legislature should
enact the two statutes as two separate articles, exactly as they currently
appear in the revised statutes. While §§ 13:4231 and 4232 could be
combined into one article if necessary, their rules are clearer when
separated. Further, res judicata, similar to lis pendens, is a significant
procedural mechanism that has important implications for the rights of
parties and as such, is deserving of its own chapter. 270 This repeal-andreplace solution is simple but highly effective. Eliminating article 425 also
eliminates any confusion about its function, thereby preventing courts or
litigants in the future from precluding suits that are not between the same
parties as a prior suit. Moving the res judicata statutes to the Code of Civil
Procedure maintains the presence of res judicata in the code—where it
belongs—that would otherwise be lost by the mere repeal of article 425.

264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.

LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 425 (2021).
Id. at bk. I, tit. II.
Id. arts. 461–465.
Id. arts. 531–532.
Id. at bk. I, tit. II, ch. 1.
Kurtz & Frilot, supra note 2, at 445.
Id.
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CONCLUSION
The current split between the Louisiana Circuit Courts of Appeal will
breed confusion and uncertainty until it is resolved by the legislature.
Under the Spires-Ward-Corollo interpretation, the Second, Third, and
Fourth circuits have held that article 425 is merely a reference to the
requirements of res judicata. 271 In contrast, the First and Fifth circuits
under the Handy-Westerman interpretation have found that article 425
operates as an independent claim-preclusion device that does not contain
the “between the same parties” requirement found in res judicata.272 An
independent statutory analysis and thorough review of the legislative
history of article 425, along with the other articles amended as part of the
1990 Res Judicata Act, reveal that the Second, Third, and Fourth circuits
correctly interpreted and applied article 425 as a warning to litigants of the
effects of res judicata. To resolve this circuit split, the Louisiana
Legislature should repeal article 425 and create a new chapter in the Code
of Civil Procedure, to which the legislature should move §§ 13:4231 and
4232.

271. Ward v. State, Dep’t of Transp. & Dev., 2 So. 3d 1231 (La. Ct. App. 2d
Cir. 2009); Spires v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 996 So. 2d 697 (La. Ct. App.
3d Cir. 2008); Carollo v. Dep’t of Transp. & Dev., 2021-0114, 2021 WL 4785542
(La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. Oct. 14, 2021).
272. Westerman v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 834 So. 2d 445, 448 (La.
Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2002); Handy v. Par. of Jefferson, 298 So. 3d 380, 390 (La. Ct.
App. 5th Cir. 2020).

